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This paper describes the regulated agricultural commodity futures market of China, focusing
on six actively traded futures: corn, strong gluten wheat, No. 1 soybean, soymeal, cotton, and
white sugar. A novel skew Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model is employed to characterize price dynamics
with government controls. The empirical analysis reveals significant skew phenomena in these six
futures and indicates that the price dynamics are influenced by state policy. The observed skew
phenomena are most notable in grain futures, with relatively weaker, but statistically significant,
evidence of skew phenomena in oilseed and soft futures markets. In addition, generalized quasi-
likelihood ratio tests show that the skew Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model is superior to the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck model.
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1 Introduction
Because of its strong and consistent demand, China has become the world’s largest importer and
consumer of commodities. Considering the important role China plays in international commodity
markets and the increasing risk management demand from entity enterprises, Chinese commodity
futures market has witnessed tremendous growth in recent years. Among the global commodity fu-
tures and options exchanges, the trading volume of the Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) ranked
first, while the Dalian Commodity Exchange (DCE) ranked second, and the Zhengzhou Commodity
Exchange (CZCE) ranked fourth in 20191. Prices on Chinese exchanges are becoming increasingly
influential. This paper focuses on agricultural commodity futures in particular. Chinese agricultural
futures accounted for 80% of the world’s top five contracts in 20191. However, to our knowledge,
they have not been thoroughly investigated. The modeling of agricultural derivatives under Chinese
heterogeneous characteristics is still undeveloped. This paper chooses six Chinese agricultural com-
modity futures that represent the most liquid contracts and are important agricultural commodities,
in part because they have become an important part of overall global futures markets, with tremen-
dous trading volume.
However, compared to foreign commodities markets, regulation is very common in Chinese mar-
kets. For agricultural commodities in particular, policies such as temporary reserve and minimum
purchase policies apply. Government authorities seek to implement macro-interventions on the prices
of agricultural commodities, with price caps and/or price supports. Such policies place invisible sup-
ports under the market. Under such policies, when the price of a commodity declines to a certain
level, it will then show a high probability of an increasing trend. Therefore, the price dynamics
are influenced by government policy. Traditional models assume that price dynamics of assets move
upwards with the same probability as downwards, and that such phenomena cannot be captured.
Accordingly, we need different models to characterize Chinese agricultural commodity futures. This
observation in part motivates our specific setting of the skew Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (skew OU) model,
first proposed by Wang et al. (2015). Similar to skew Brownian motion (SBM) introduced by Itô and
Mckean (1965), the skew OU model adds a local time term to the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) model
to capture both mean-reverting and regulatory characteristics of dynamics. The local time term has
two parameters, skew level and skew probability. When the process hits the skew level, it moves up
with skew probability and moves down with 1 minus skew probability. In general, skew probability
tends to differ from 0.5, reflecting specific controlled and regulated characteristics. We define the
phenomenon in which dynamics move upwards with different probability to moving downwards when
hitting a certain level as “skew phenomenon”. Specifically, the skew OU model will reduce to the OU
model if skew probability equals 0.5, and to the reflected OU model if skew probability equals 0 or 1.
The mean-reverting feature of commodity prices is pointed out in a number of studies. Bessem-
binder et al. (1995) shows that for agricultural commodities, the observed mean reversion is large in
magnitude compared to other commodities and arises from positive comovement between prices and
implied cash flow yields. Schwartz (1997) gives prices of commodity and futures contracts when taking
into account mean reversion. This author suggests that it is quite important to consider mean rever-
sion in prices when implementing capital budgeting. If mean reversion is neglected, we would induce
investment too late. Schwartz and Smith (2000) develops a model of commodity prices that allows
1Data are from the Futures Industry Association (FIA).
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for mean reversion in short-term prices while simultaneously allowing uncertainty in the equilibrium
level to which prices revert. Geman (2005), in an introduction to commodity derivatives markets
and modeling, points out that mean reversion is a salient feature of commodity prices. Casassus and
Collin-Dufresne (2005) identify two sources of mean reversion for commodity prices. Li and Linetsky
(2014) holds that the geometric OU model plays the same role in commodity markets as the geometric
Brownian motion model plays in the equity markets.
However, as stated above, in Chinese agricultural markets, regulation is common. The OU model
has no way to characterize this regulatory phenomenon, while the skew OU model can capture spe-
cific regulated characteristics and preserve mean-reverting features at the same time. A large body
of literature examines regulated markets. Motivated by the European Monetary System (EMS) ex-
change rate under its target zone, Krugman (1991) first modeled the target zone of foreign exchange
rates, which is perfectly credible. Also, Bo et al. (2013, 2011a,b), Bo (2013) , Lee and Song (2016),
Yang et al. (2016), Han et al. (2016, 2019) and Cai and Yang (2018, 2020) examine reflected diffusion
processes that can capture perfectly credible boundaries. However, a process may breach the officially
declared boundaries of the target zone. There may be a “soft” floor or ceiling. Svensson (1991) and
Farnsworth and Bass (2003) study semi-credible interest rates targets. Avriel et al. (2013) models
partially credible inflation target regimes. Similar phenomena can be observed in Chinese agricultur-
al commodity markets. Although the minimum purchase policy is present, there may be hysteresis
from the intervention. For soft target zones, skew models can capture a controlled probability of the
process wandering beyond particular boundaries. Wang et al. (2015) assumes the logarithmic price
of an asset follows the skew OU process. The price of a defaultable zero coupon bond with zero
recovery and conditional default probability under incomplete information is calculated. Zhuo and
Menoukeupamen (2017) assume that the short rate is given by a generalized skew OU model with
discontinuous drift coefficient and provide corresponding bond prices and European/American bond
option prices. In terms of empirical research based on the skew OU model, Zhuo (2018) applies the
skew OU model to the Chinese short-term interest rate market and finds that skew levels act as invis-
ible pressure levels that are significant and persistent. Bai and Guo (2019) find that skew probability
is quite different from 0.5 for stock index markets. In addition, some literature examines the impact
of policy on financial markets. Mohanty and Mishra (2020) study the effect of regulatory reform
on Indian agricultural commodity futures market. Klomp (2020) investigate policy impacts on the
return of agricultural commodity futures in the EU. Perera et al. (2020) study a specific agricultural
commodity, tea, and analyze the corresponding regulatory environment. Chen and Chiang (2020)
investigate policy uncertainty in China’s stock market. Jian et al. (2018) and Huo and Ahmed (2018)
research the stock index futures market in the context of China.
Several works implement the skew OU model in the pricing of derivatives and capture skew phe-
nomena in interest markets, but not for commodity markets. All the works cited above indicate the
validity of the skew OU model. Our aim here is to study skew phenomena in agricultural commodity
futures market, and to show whether the skew OU model is superior to the OU model. Thus, we
assume that the logarithm of agricultural commodity futures prices follow the skew OU model and fits
historical daily settlement data for corn, strong gluten wheat, No. 1 soybean, soymeal, white sugar,
and cotton futures. We design a significance test to investigate whether skew probabilities in these
markets are significantly different from 0.5. Further, we conduct a generalized quasi-likelihood ratio
test to determine whether the skew OU model is more suitable than the OU model. Our principal
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findings indicate that there are indeed significant skew phenomena in Chinese agricultural commodity
futures market. Understanding skew phenomena in agricultural commodity futures market is impor-
tant for two main reasons. First, it allows us to capture specific regulation-related characteristics
in these markets. Second, it indicates the effectiveness of government regulatory policy, as reflected
by the magnitude of skew probabilities. The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section
2 describes our data and sets forth our motivation for choosing the skew OU model. Section 3 pro-
vides a brief introduction to our models. Section 4 discusses our empirical results. Finally, Section 5
summarizes our results.
2 Data, Summary Statistics, and Characteristics of Price
Changes
2.1 Data
This paper focuses on the six agricultural commodities that have the most actively traded futures
studied in the literature. They can be separated into three groups: corn and strong gluten wheat are
grain products, No. 1 soybean and soymeal are oilseed products, and white sugar and cotton represent
soft products2. Among grain products, China is the world’s second-largest corn producer, second only
to the U.S.3, and Chinas trading volume in corn futures ranked fifth in 20194. Wheat is the second-
largest grain crop in the world, second only to corn. Wheat futures are divided into strong gluten,
medium gluten, and weak gluten. Trading volumes of strong gluten wheat futures are much higher than
common wheat futures. Among oilseed products, China is the world’s largest importer and consumer
of soybeans, accounting for about 60% of global soybean trade in 20195. The underlying product of
the No. 1 soybean contract is non-transgenic soybean. The No. 1 soybean contract is chosen because
it represents domestic non-transgenic soybeans, while No. 2 soybean contracts represent soybean
for oil extraction mainly from imported transgenic soybeans. The delivery standards for imported
transgenic soybeans are relatively strict. Therefore, trading volumes and open positions for No. 1
soybeans are much larger. Market liquidity of futures contracts affects the quality of futures data. As
a result, the No. 1 soybean contract is more suitable for research. Soymeal is a by-product of soybean
oil extraction. The oil yield of transgenic soybean is much higher than that of non-transgenic soybean,
and without doubt, transgenic soybean is used mainly for oil extraction. Therefore, soymeal prices
are highly correlated with transgenic soybean. The DCE’s soymeal contract remained the world’s
largest agricultural contract by volume for eight consecutive years since 20104. Among soft products,
China ranks first in production, input, and consumption of cotton in the world6. The CZCE sugar
contract ranked fourth in global agricultural derivatives markets in 20194. We are interested in these
six particular agricultural markets in part because of their growing importance in the world market.
Our data on agricultural commodity futures are obtained from the Wind database, which contains
daily futures settlement prices. Data are available for different sample periods depending on the launch
date of contracts. The sample periods all end on December 22, 2018. As futures contracts expire after
2Our classification is similar to that of the Institute for Financial Markets.
3Information is from DCE.
4Data are from FIA .
5Data are from United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).
6Information is from CZCE.
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several months, we construct a continuous sequence by choosing the data from the dominant future
contracts with the largest trading volume. We choose futures data instead of spot data for two reasons.
First, futures data are undoubtedly of higher quality, because they represent real trading prices with
fewer missing values. Second, futures data are more uniform than spot prices. Table 1 lists the six
agricultural commodities futures in our analysis, together with contract names, the exchanges on
which they trade, transaction codes, and the starting date of available daily settlement data.
Table 1: Information for six agricultural commodity futures
Commodity Exchange traded Transaction code Launch date
Grains
Corn DCE C 2004.09.22
Strong gluten wheat CZCE H 2003.03.28
Oilseeds
No. 1 Soybean DCE A 2002.03.15
Soymeal DCE M 2000.07.17
Softs
Cotton CZCE CF 2004.06.01
White sugar CZCE SR 2006.01.16
Notes: This table presents the six commodity futures employed in this study. The six futures are classified
into three categories and traded on two main commodity exchanges in China. Launch date is the beginning
of the sample period. Source: Wind database.
2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2 reports mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis
values as well as the Jarque–Bera test results of the logarithm of six futures prices. The mean values
of logarithmic prices range from 7.5188 to 9.6583, while volatility varies from 0.1916 to 0.2229. The
results show that futures have relatively higher returns but are more risky. The skewness of the six
futures logarithmic prices differs from 0 and kurtosis is greater than 3. Jarque–Bera tests reject the
null hypothesis that their distributions are normal at the 1% significance level. The skew OU model
describes the non-normal characteristics of assets to some extent.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for six agricultural commodity futures
Corn Strong gluten wheat No. 1 soybean Soymeal Cotton White sugar
Mean 7.5188 7.7308 8.1920 7.8950 9.6583 8.5297
Median 7.4997 7.8178 8.2372 7.9359 9.6150 8.5529
Max. 7.8493 8.0690 8.5574 8.3770 10.4450 8.9286
Min. 7.0317 7.2984 7.6039 7.3499 9.2098 7.9417
Std. Dev. 0.2154 0.1916 0.2229 0.2196 0.2137 0.2169
Skewness -0.2347 -0.4135 -0.6953 -0.6178 1.0019 -0.3848
Kurtosis 2.1113 1.8247 2.5326 2.7495 4.1241 2.4297
J-B 145.7072 328.8878 365.6029 296.4432 779.4788 120.4420
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observation 3462 3822 4077 4476 3544 3151
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for the six commodity futures used in this study. The sample
spans from the launch date of each contract to December 22, 2018. Source: Wind database.
4
2.3 Characteristics of Price Changes
Figures 1-6 below plot the logarithm of agricultural commodity futures prices together with their
international counterparts. The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) is the world’s largest futures market
for agricultural commodities and the center for pricing global agricultural commodities. The CBOT
futures price has become the benchmark price for the global corn, wheat, soybean, and soymeal trade.
Therefore, daily settlement prices for international corn, wheat, soybean, and soymeal futures are
obtained from the CBOT. The Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) is the recognized cotton and sugar
pricing center. Daily settlement prices of international cotton and sugar contracts are obtained from
ICE. We perform two rounds of data processing to obtain our paired data. The first is trading-day
processing. Due to the inconsistency of holidays in different markets and the absence of trading on
certain days, to maintain data pairing, all non-paired data are deleted. The second is the handling
of quote units. The quotation units in the Chinese futures market are all in RMB/ton. To maintain
consistency, futures quotations from corresponding international markets are uniformly converted into
RMB/ton through the exchange rate of RMB/USD on the same day, along with the corresponding
conversion relationship of weight units.
Figure 1, indicates that it took only about 2 years for the logarithm of corn futures prices to rise
from 7.3 in the beginning of 2009 to 7.8 at the end of 2010. As a result of the temporary reserve policy,
domestic corn prices showed a steady upward trend. Then, prices of corn futures experienced relatively
small shocks for about three years. Corn prices in China are relatively independent from international
prices because of a strict import quota7. Since 2012, international corn prices have peaked and entered
a long bear market, while domestic corn prices stayed at a relatively stable level. The main reason
for this is powerful government intervention. However, from February 2015 to August 2015, domestic
corn prices dropped dramatically. The temporary reserve policy began to enter a new stage of reform,
and the government pushed to cut stocks. After 2016, corn prices began a new round of increase
following the reform. Strong gluten wheat futures, shown in Figure 2, show price fluctuations, but the
long-term upward trend is very clear compared to its international counterpart. The market price of
wheat, on the whole, is centered on the minimum purchase price set by the government. As planting
costs rose year by year, to protect the interests of farmers, China gradually raised the minimum
purchase price. At the same time, the country strictly limited import volume7 and thus the price was
not very market-based. Domestic wheat prices stood in stark contrast to the sharp fluctuations of
international wheat prices shown in Figure 2.
Figure 3 shows two drastic fluctuations in the dynamics of No. 1 soybean futures. The first one
occurred from August 2003 to August 2004, known as the soybean crisis. The USDA announced
that soybean stocks were at a 20-year low in August 2003. In response, the price of soybeans surged
to a 30-year high in April 2004. Chinese companies began panic purchases of soybeans at relatively
high prices. However, after completing these purchases, soybean prices fell sharply in just two months,
causing soybean enterprises in China to suffer huge losses. In addition, the financial crisis of 2008 gave
rise to another drastic drop in soybean prices. The Chinese government implemented a temporary
reserve policy for soybeans from 2008 to 2013, which formed strong support for soybeans. During
this period, dynamic fluctuations in the Chinese soybean futures market were smaller compared to
international counterparts. The prices of soymeal shown in Figure 4 also experienced two similar
7According to the Ministry of Agriculture, domestic policies for principal food commodities (corn, wheat, and rice)
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Figure 1: Logarithm of corn futures prices
Notes: This figure plots logarithmic prices of corn futures in DCE (solid curve) together with their international
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Figure 2: Logarithm of strong gluten wheat futures prices
Notes: This figure plots the logarithmic prices of strong gluten wheat futures in CZCE (solid curve) together
with their international counterparts in CBOT (dashed curve). The sample period spans March 28, 2003 to
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Figure 3: Logarithm of No. 1 soybean futures prices
Notes: This figure plots the logarithmic prices of No. 1 Soybean futures in DCE (solid curve) together
with their international counterparts in CBOT (dashed curve). The sample period spans March 15, 2002 to
December 22, 2018. Source: Wind database.
drastic fluctuations, because they are by-products. However, soymeal prices were more affected by
international transgenic soybean prices. Therefore, fluctuations in soymeal markets were relatively
larger than those in No. 1 soybean markets.
Figure 5 shows that prices of cotton futures reached a high point in 2011 and then experienced
wild fluctuations. The trading volume of cotton futures in 2011 was second only to crude oil futures
globally. From 2012 to 2013, cotton futures prices changed gradually compared to their international
counterparts because of the temporary reserve policy. In 2014, China carried out a cotton price
reform and handed pricing power to the market. Cotton prices then declined for about two years.
For white sugar futures, shown in Figure 6, periodicity is relatively clear because of the characteristic
of perennial root growth for sugarcane, the main source of white sugar in China. In the first year,
sugarcane is planted and then perennial roots grow for about three years. Therefore, yield increases
in the first three years, then decreases in the next three years. Growth habit is an important factor
influencing prices of white sugar. Long-term sugar prices decline for three years, then increase over
the next three years, in contrast to yield trends. In addition to the effect of growth habit, there is
also a temporary reserve policy in the sugar market. Compared to ICE international sugar futures,
the Chinese sugar market is less volatile.
Compared to foreign commodities markets, regulation is very common in Chinese markets. Gov-
ernment policies create invisible supports under the market. The OU model has no way to characterize
this regulatory phenomenon, while the skew OU model can capture specific regulatory characteristics
and preserve mean-reverting features at the same time. This observation forms part of the motivation
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Figure 4: Logarithm of soymeal futures
Notes: This figure plots the logarithmic prices of soymeal futures in DCE (solid curve) together with their
international counterparts in CBOT (dashed curve). The sample period spans July 17, 2000 to December 22,










2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
ICE_COTTON CZCE_COTTON
Figure 5: Logarithm of cotton futures prices
Notes: This figure plots the logarithmic prices of cotton futures in CZCE (solid curve) together with their
international counterparts in ICE (dashed curve). The sample period spans June 1, 2004 to December 22,
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Figure 6: Logarithm of white sugar futures prices
Notes: This figure plots the logarithmic prices of white sugar futures in CZCE (solid curve) together with their
international counterparts in ICE (dashed curve). The sample period spans January 16, 2006 to December
22, 2018. Source: Wind database.
the skew OU model.
3 Skew Diffusion Processes and Parameter Estimation
This section presents dynamics of the logarithm of agricultural commodity futures prices that follow
skew OU processes. When considering model estimation, local time components are hard to address.
Therefore, we derive respective transformed processes such that local time terms can be removed
and the processes are more tractable. Further, we provide a method to test whether the skew OU
process can better fit a given dataset compared to the OU process model. To this end, we conduct a
generalized quasi-likelihood ratio test on six agricultural commodity futures where the null hypothesis
is that the OU process is more suitable. In addition, we conduct a significance test to determine
whether the skew probability differs from 0.5.
3.1 Skew OU Process
Let us fix a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and an information filtration {Ft}t≥0. Similar to Schwartz
(1997), we assume that commodity futures price Ft follows the stochastic process:
dFt = κ (µ− lnFt)Ftdt+ σFtdWt. (2.1)
This specification of the model can prevent the price from being negative. Based on their model,
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we add a symmetrical local time component to reflect regulatory characteristics:





where κ, µ, σ, p and aF are unknown structural parameters. In this setting, κ > 0 is the speed of





is the symmetric local time of the continuous semi-martingale F = {Ft,Ft; 0 ≤ t < +∞} at
skew level aF , while p ∈ (0, 1) is the skew probability capturing the possibility of upward movement
after hitting skew level a. More details on the symmetrical local time component are shown in
Appendix A.
Defining Xt = lnFt and applying the generalized Itô formula (Revuz and Yor, 1999) on Eq.(2.2),
we show that the logarithmic price submits to the skew OU process:
dXt = κ (θ −Xt) dt+ σdWt + (2p− 1) dL̂Xt (a) , (2.3)
where θ = µ− σ
2
2κ and a = ln a
F .
All investigations described in this paper are based on Eq.(2.3) and the empirical research is based
on logarithmic price.
3.2 Methods of Estimation
This section proposes a method to estimate the skew OU process. The estimation of SBM used by
Lejay and Pichot (2012) is not suitable for skew OU processes with non-constant drift. Further, the
method introduced by Bardou and Martinez (2010) requires that the coefficients of the OU component
are already known and involves a complex multiple integral. This method does not work either. Thus,
we put forward a Bayesian approach that can estimate all parameters together and is easily applied
to both simulations and real data. Liang et al. (2019) employ a Bayesian method to real gas data.
Since the local time component is difficult to address, before estimation, we define a transformed
process Yt := G(Xt) to remove it using methods introduced by Harrison and Shepp (1981),
G(Xt) =
 (1− p) (Xt − a) + a, if Xt ≥ a,p (Xt − a) + a, if Xt < a. (2.4)














a, if Yt < a.
(2.5)
We apply the generalized Itô formula (Revuz and Yor, 1999) to process Yt; it then satisfies the
following stochastic differential equation:
dYt =
 κ [(1− p) θ + pa− Yt] dt+ (1− p)σdWt, if Yt ≥ a,κ [pθ + (1− p) a− Yt] dt+ pσdWt, if Yt < a. (2.6)
We finally obtain the new process Yt without the local time component. The transformation is
described in Appendix B. Then, we assume that we are given the data sampled at equally spaced time
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points t1 < · · · < tN+1, by setting yti , Yti+1 − Yti and xti , Yti , the discretized version of Eq.(2.6)
can be expressed as:
yti =
 κ [(1− p) θ + pa]4t− κ4txti + (1− p)σ
√
4tεti , if xti ≥ a,
κ [pθ + (1− p) a]4t− κ4txti + pσ
√
4tεti , if xti < a.
(2.7)
where i = 1, 2, · · · , N , 4t = ti+1−ti and {εti}
N
i=1 are independent and standard normally distributed.
The discretized version is similar to the threshold autoregressive model, which is usually estimated
via Bayesian estimation method. We eliminate local time items via transformation. Only when a set
of skew levels and skew probability values are given in advance can we achieve this goal. Tradition-
al estimation methods are troublesome in this case, while Bayesian estimation method has several
advantages.
Accordingly, a Bayesian estimation method is adopted. First, owing to the work described above,





































where Θ is the set of five parameters
{
κ, θ, σ2, a, p
}
for the skew OU process, and X represents the
data set. N1 , {i : i = 1, · · · , N, a ≤ xti} and N2 , {i : i = 1, · · · , N, xti < a} where n1 and n2 are
the amounts of i included in the sets N1 and N2, respectively.
Then, we obtain the Bayesian estimates. The joint distribution of parameters is difficult to address.
Therefore, we use the Gibbs sampling method to simulate the conditional posterior distributions of pa-
rameters and loop 1000 times. Discarding the first 200 sampling values, we get parameter estimations
through taking the average of the last 800 sampling values. The standard deviation of the parameter
equals that of the last 800 sampling values. To this end, we first define the prior distributions of Θ







and N (µθ, σ2θ). The prior of σ2 is assumed to be an inverse gamma
distribution IG (ασ, λσ). Also, we consider the prior of a and p to follow discrete uniform distributions
on sets {a1, · · · , an} and {p1, · · · , pn}. Further, we derive the conditional posterior distributions of
Θ in Appendix C. From the above analysis, we use the Gibbs sampler to simulate the conditional
posterior distributions. By generating a Markov chain of parameters, we obtain the estimations of Θ.
We also detect convergence through a convergence diagnostic (CD) test as in Appendix D.
3.3 Significance Test of Skew Probability
We address whether the estimate of the skew probability p̂ is significantly different from 0.5. Skew
level is significant only when the skew probability estimate is significantly different from 0.5. This
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amounts to testing H0 : κ = κ1, θ = θ1, σ = σ1, a = a1, p = 0.5 against H1 : κ = κ1, θ = θ1, σ = σ1,
a = a1, p = p1. Parameters in the hypothesis are all estimated via the skew OU model.
Under the null hypothesis, the log-likelihood function is:















· ln[(1− p1)2 σ214t] +
∑
i∈N1{yti + κ14txti − κ14t [(1− p1) θ1 + p1a1]}
2
















where n1 + n2 = N .
The plausibility of the hypotheses can then be evaluated by:
λ(X) = 2 [l(H1)− l(H0)] ,
where X is the sample data.
To test the significance of the estimated value of the skew probability, it is necessary to know the
distribution of λ(X) under the null hypothesis. We use the bootstrap procedure to get the distribution
when the skew probability equals 0.5. Under the null hypothesis, we first generate simulated sample
X∗ from dXt = κ1 (θ1 −Xt) dt + σ1dWt + (2 · 0.5− 1) dL̂Xt (a1) and then estimate the parameters
via Bayesian methods. Finally, we obtain the test statistics λ(X∗). We repeat this procedure 10,000
times and get 10,000 λ(X∗) to estimate the distribution of λ(X) under the null hypothesis.
Thus, we observe that when skew probability equals 0.5, l (H1) will not reduce to l (H0). Therefore,
we cannot conclude that if skew probability p is not significantly different from 0.5, the values of l (H1)
and l (H0) will be close. As a result, extreme small-probability cases on both sides are taken as rejection
domains. If the p-value of λ(X) is too small for a particular level of significance, we can reject the
null hypothesis and illustrate that the skew probability is significant.
3.4 Goodness-of-fit Test
Because the OU model can be regarded as a special case of the skew OU model by setting p equal to
0.5, it is natural to ask whether the skew OU model can do a better job at fitting the dynamics of
Chinese agricultural commodity futures prices. In other words, are there truly skew phenomena in the
Chinese agricultural commodity futures market? This amounts to testing H0 : κ = κ0, θ = θ0, σ = σ0,
p = 0.5 against H1 : κ = κ1, θ = θ1, σ = σ1, a = a1, p = p1. Parameters in the null hypothesis are
estimated via OU model while those in the alternative hypothesis are estimated via skew OU model.
Under the null hypothesis, the log-likelihood function is:










Under the alternative hypothesis, the log-likelihood function l (H1) is the same as Eq.(2.10). The
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plausibility of the hypotheses can then be evaluated by:
λ(X) = 2 [l(H1)− l(H0)] ,
where X is the sample data.
Note that the distribution of λ(X) under the null hypothesis is difficult to calculate. Thus, we
use the bootstrap procedure to determine whether to reject the null hypothesis. Under the null
hypothesis, we first generate simulated sample X∗ from the OU process by setting the parameters at
the maximum likelihood estimates, and then estimate the parameters using Bayesian methods. In this
way, we obtain the test statistics λ(X∗). We repeat this procedure 10,000 times and obtain 10,000
λ(X∗) to estimate the distribution of λ(X) under the null hypothesis.
As illustrated in subsection 3.2, because local time is hard to address directly, we do not tackle the
original process with the local time component. Instead, we transform the process into a tractable
piecewise diffusion without local time. Therefore, before we estimate the skew OU process, we need
to perform a piecewise transformation on the data. As a result, even when skew probability equals
0.5, l (H1) will not reduce to l (H0). Therefore, similar to subsection 3.3, we choose extremely low
probability cases on both sides as rejection domains. If the p-value of λ(X) is too small, we can reject
the null hypothesis and illustrate that the skew OU model is superior to the OU model.
4 Empirical Results
Tables 3-8 list parameter estimation results of mean-reversion coefficients, long-term mean, volatility,
skew levels, skew probabilities, as well as corresponding p-values and p-values of generalized quasi-
likelihood ratio tests for the skew OU model. In addition, we report OU estimates. The model is
separately estimated for each future and all calculations are realized via R software. Considering that
outliers have a great impact on estimation results, we use the 3-sigma criterion to eliminate outliers.
In addition, because the data in the first year are incomplete and the quality of data when futures are
just launched is not sufficient, we estimate all parameters from the second year of the sample period.
Table 3 provides estimation results with respect to corn futures while Tables 4-8 provide similar results
for strong gluten wheat, No. 1 soybean, soymeal, cotton, and white sugar, respectively.
4.1 Grain Futures Market
Mean-reversion coefficients for corn futures vary significantly from year to year8. Years 2012 and 2014
had much stronger mean-reversion parameters, which means that it took less time to go from the
starting value to the long-term mean. Values of parameters are not stable across time, indicating
that it is useful to estimate parameters by year, or in the future, allow parameters to be time-variant.
Among all parameters, skew levels and skew probabilities are of great interest. In addition, among all
estimates, results significant at the 10% level interest us most. When logarithmic prices hit the skew
level, in addition to the fact that the mean reversion term will pull the price toward the long-term
level, the market will exert additional forces to cause the price to have a higher probability of reverting.
Table 3 shows that skew probabilities are significantly different from 0.5 in almost half the samples
for corn futures at the 10% significance level. In 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2009, skew levels behaved like
8According to the nonparametric model introduced by Fan et al. (2003), κ also varies by year.
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potential supporting lines, with corresponding skew probabilities greater than 0.5. In 2013, 2014, and
2015, they acted as lines of pressure with corresponding skew probabilities smaller than 0.5. Figure 7
illustrates this in a more intuitive way. When skew probability is clearly different from 0.5, we label
its corresponding skew level in Figure 7. If the skew probability is larger (smaller) than 0.5, we treat
its corresponding skew level, marked in red (green) in Figure 7, as a support (resistance) line.
Why do skew phenomena exist? Skew level formation is likely to be associated with government
intervention. For the corn market, a specific purchase price is announced every year before planting.
Annual purchases of grain by state-owned grain enterprises account for at least 40% of the newly
planted grain, which enables the government to control the grain supply, enabling a substantial impact
on the purchase market. Annual sales by state-owned grain enterprises also account for significantly
more than 40% of grain circulation. Consequently, such enterprises are able to effectively influence
prices in the grain sales market9. Despite the fact that government intervention is implemented
mainly in the spot market, it is common knowledge that futures and spot prices are highly correlated.
Therefore, factors affecting spot prices will also influence futures prices. Skew levels estimated by
the skew OU model behave like price levels of temporary reserves in the corn market. For example,
the average price for temporary purchase and stocking of corn in 2008 and 2009 was approximately
1,500 RMB per ton; in 2013 and 2014 it was approximately 2,240 RMB per ton, while in 2015 it was
approximately 2,000 RMB per ton 10, very close to the skew levels. As the skew probability deviates
from 0.5, the skew level is harder to break through, which indicates that government intervention
policy is effective. For example, the skew probability of corn futures in 2009 was 0.8080, which means
that when prices of corn futures hit the skew level, there was an 80.80% probability of a future rise.
The government implemented a temporary reserve policy for corn from the end of 2008, which played
an important role in supporting the market.
The original intention of the policy was to encourage the planting of corn to ensure national
food security. However, international agricultural prices, including corn, plunged after 2011, while
domestic corn prices have risen yearly. That left domestic stocks piling up, resulting in a glut. The
import volume of corn in China was relatively restricted and differences between internal and external
prices made domestic corn enterprises come under high cost pressures. Multiple factors led to a
higher probability of declining corn prices, as reflected in low skew probabilities in 2013 and 2014.
As shown in Figure 1, since 2012, international corn prices have peaked and entered a long bear
market, while domestic corn prices remained at a relatively stable level. Although government policy
supported the market, the true dynamics meant potential downward pressure, as reflected by skew
probabilities of less than 0.5. Skew phenomena were not significant from 2010 to 2012. According
to the Ministry of Agriculture, the amount of corn reserve was close to zero in these three years.
Therefore, government intervention in this case was limited. In 2015, skew probability was 0.1621,
far less than 0.5. When prices of corn futures hit the skew level, there was only a 16.21% probability
of a price increase. The government for the first time lowered purchase prices in 2015, cutting them
about 12%. This event was regarded as a signal that the government would implement temporary
reserve policy reform. In addition, previous overstocking put pressure on prices. The total stock of
state reserves reached 236 million tons, and the inventory-to-consumption ratio reached a new high
of 106% in 201510. Government policy no longer acted as the supporting power but as a signal that
9Information is from China Grain Development Report.
10Data are from futures company.
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corn prices would decline in the future. After 2015, there occurred no significant skew phenomena
in corn futures markets. In March 2016, the government abolished the policy of temporary reserves
and proposed a new policy of market-based purchases and subsidies. The degree of marketization of
corn increased, and the government began to weaken macro-regulation. Such changes in policy can
be detected in the disappearance of skew phenomena.
If skew probability is close to 0.5, breaking through potential boundaries is acceptable. The
government believed price fluctuations could be addressed through market mechanics. As reported in
Table 3, skew probabilities for 2006 and 2008 were very close to 0.5, which meant that corresponding
skew levels were soft. Once the price hits the skew level, the probability of going up or down is about
the same. Under this circumstance, government intervention is less effective.
The CD statistics in Table 3 show that the Markov chains attain convergence, indicating that the
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimations are effective. The generalized quasi-likelihood ratio
test is statistically significant at the 10% level, indicating that the skew OU model is superior to the
OU model when skew phenomena are significant in corn futures markets. In addition, we report the
estimation results of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) for the OU model, with parameters κ, θ
and σ. Parameters κ in the OU model are not significant in most years. These results show that the
skew OU model is superior to the OU model when modeling the Chinese corn futures market with
government controls.
Skew phenomenon is significant for more than half of samples in the strong gluten wheat market.
For strong gluten wheat futures, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2015 formed strong levels of support,
while 2004, 2005, 2014, and 2017 showed significant resistance. These phenomena are also observed in
Figure 8. The government first implemented a floor purchase price policy for wheat in 2006. Although
the policy was first set in 2005, it was not launched that year. After implementation of the policy,
wheat prices showed a clear upward trend. The minimum purchase price level of wheat increased
steadily from 2006 to 2014, with a cumulative increase of over 70%11. From parameter estimation
results of the skew OU model, we find that it took several years for this policy to work. Since 2008, the
wheat market showed significant supporting levels in four years, except for 2011. According to data
from the China Statistical Yearbook, since the start of the minimum purchase policy, except for 2005
and 2011, wheat purchases were launched in all other years, with a cumulative purchase of more than
300 million tons. In 2011, the market price of wheat was higher than the minimum purchase price,
so the government did not implement a minimum-price purchase. The skew OU model can exactly
detect such a change in policy. The quantity of the minimum purchase also affected the efficiency
of government policy. In 2013, this quantity accounted for only about 6% of total production. Such
effects are also demonstrated by no significant skew phenomena in 2013. In other years, the percentage
was more than 20% and approached 40%. As a whole, government policies could have a relatively
important impact on the market. Skew levels in 2004, 2005, 2014, and 2017 acted as pressure levels.
The increase in yields, imports, and local reserves of wheat in 2004 and 2005 resulted in higher supply
that did not match demand. Thus, wheat prices showed downward pressure. Skew levels may act as
psychological price levels for farmers and investors. Psychological barriers can be regarded as price
levels that are psychologically important to the extent that the market finds it difficult to reach that
11Data are from the China Food Network.
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Table 3: Parameter estimation results of skew OU model in corn futures market
Year
Skew OU estimates OU estimates
κ̂ θ̂ σ̂ â p̂ p-value1 p-value2 κ̂0 θ̂0 σ̂0
2005
0.7694 7.1396 0.0688 7.1166 0.6176 0.0666 0.0669 -0.0687 5.5706 0.0705
(0.2887) (0.0931) (0.0033) (0.0286) (0.1440) (413.3626) (399.8487) (1.6394) (37.3042) (0.0033)
[1.2069] [-0.3892] [0.4217] [0.4347] [-0.9321] [395.2732] [385.1865] [1111.6837]
2006
0.4707 7.2971 0.1058 7.3328 0.5778 0.0547 0.0852 -0.9302 7.2564 0.1061
(0.4745) (0.0829) (0.0057) (0.0364) (0.2227) (282.4286) (282.0988) (2.3550) (0.1395) (0.0050)
[-0.4329] [0.6808] [0.1591] [1.0118] [0.4559] [298.9633] [287.4541] [1041.8828]
2007
3.4707 7.3938 0.0967 7.4083 0.5589 0.2848 0.3143 3.5777 7.3961 0.0989
(0.4043) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0265) (0.2138) (357.3540) (350.0399) (2.3150) (0.0306) (0.0046)
[-0.7253] [1.3323] [-1.3011] [-0.6394] [1.5810] [399.1355] [399.8258] [1062.7608]
2008
1.4680 7.4649 0.1157 7.4438 0.5824 0.0981 0.0888 1.4420 7.3336 0.1165
(0.6666) (0.0894) (0.0060) (0.0451) (0.2321) (404.0292) (399.6292) (1.5681) (0.1781) (0.0054)
[0.5894] [-0.1227] [0.4087] [-1.1167] [-0.0466] [403.2298] [395.1575] [1042.3887]
2009
1.5419 7.4845 0.0601 7.3785 0.8080 <0.0001 <0.0001 1.0818 7.4978 0.0619
(0.3986) (0.0148) (0.0026) (0.0211) (0.0801) (939.4463) (910.6081) (1.5850) (0.1159) (0.0029)
[-0.1464] [1.1501] [-0.7510] [-0.9566] [0.2361] [402.8311] [397.6664] [1186.4480]
2010
0.8378 7.6107 0.0749 7.6546 0.5578 0.1998 0.1446 0.8168 7.7152 0.0752
(0.4904) (0.0722) (0.0043) (0.0848) (0.1414) (318.4740) (310.3234) (1.0620) (0.1773) (0.0035)
[0.2721] [0.2471] [1.1207] [0.3319] [1.3382] [394.4209] [391.9507] [1121.4094]
2011
1.0684 7.7376 0.0687 7.7604 0.5518 0.4500 0.4195 1.0670 7.7228 0.0702
(0.2467) (0.0069) (0.0035) (0.0110) (0.0837) (342.5040) (334.4665) (2.2710) (0.1005) (0.0033)
[-1.0551] [1.3860] [-0.1622] [-0.1555] [-0.1527] [399.4539] [398.9143] [1137.3072]
2012
7.0803 7.7871 0.0526 7.7811 0.4303 0.2953 0.1753 7.4217 7.7862 0.0535
(0.6713) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0225) (0.2374) (333.3982) (322.0485) (2.9873) (0.0076) (0.0025)
[-1.0242] [0.4962] [-1.1496] [-0.7111] [1.5682] [425.5555] [423.6249] [1215.8256]
2013
2.9117 7.7737 0.0361 7.7860 0.2515 0.0238 0.0407 2.7968 7.7688 0.0383
(0.2913) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0837) (464.6178) (438.2453) (1.9136) (0.0153) (0.0018)
[1.5693] [-1.3005] [0.3989] [-0.0708] [0.2686] [397.5832] [396.9157] [1277.4508]
2014
7.3876 7.7796 0.0351 7.7870 0.2854 <0.0001 <0.0001 10.9909 7.7796 0.0418
(0.7521) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0720) (1059.1542) (828.5274) (4.3212) (0.0050) (0.0019)
[0.3131] [-0.4063] [-0.1081] [1.4725] [-1.5390] [419.3665] [429.3621] [1317.0632]
2015
0.1749 7.6881 0.0829 7.7517 0.1621 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0848 8.7265 0.0926
(0.1132) (0.0965) (0.0040) (0.0177) (0.1295) (901.8287) (776.8988) (0.7259) (8.9947) (0.0043)
[0.9140] [0.3700] [-1.0590] [-1.2118] [-0.8361] [399.9555] [399.2811] [1101.1737]
2016
0.5763 7.3497 0.1260 7.5075 0.4891 0.2382 0.0166 0.5856 7.3458 0.1455
(0.2941) (0.0968) (0.0056) (0.0600) (0.2535) (366.3152) (230.7857) (1.7204) (0.2556) (0.0067)
[1.4798] [0.0562] [-0.1783] [0.8398] [0.3806] [398.6448] [295.3568] [1002.5336]
2017
4.0244 7.4371 0.0766 7.3947 0.5065 0.4319 0.2313 3.7945 7.4364 0.0792
(0.3259) (0.0019) (0.0036) (0.0109) (0.0906) (341.0584) (328.9115) (2.2217) (0.0244) (0.0037)
[0.4709] [0.3505] [-0.7824] [0.6789] [0.4539] [418.0268] [417.6862] [1109.3311]
2018
3.3583 7.5094 0.0674 7.5388 0.4423 0.2407 0.2826 3.1315 7.5114 0.0687
(0.4560) (0.0040) (0.0032) (0.0144) (0.2436) (350.1426) (339.8636) (2.1240) (0.0231) (0.0032)
[-0.3057] [-0.1186] [-0.1054] [-0.0789] [-1.6367] [389.1472] [381.9090] [1122.4319]
Notes: Columns (2) to (6) report estimation results based on skew OU model via Bayesian methods. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. CD statistics are reported in square brackets. Column (7) reports p-value1
of whether the estimator of the skew probability is significantly different from 0.5. Column (8) reports p-value2
of the generalized quasi-likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that the OU model is more suitable than
the skew OU model. Corresponding test statistics are reported in parentheses. To save space, the critical
values at the significance level of 10% used are reported in square brackets. Columns (9) to (11) report
estimation results based on the OU model via MLE methods. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Values of the maximized log-likelihood function are reported in square brackets. The estimation period is
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Figure 7: Skew phenomena in corn futures market
Notes: This figure shows logarithmic prices of corn futures (solid curve) with skew levels where skew proba-
bilities are significantly larger than 0.5 (horizontal red dashed lines) and skew levels where skew probabilities
are significantly smaller than 0.5 (horizontal green dashed lines). Vertical dashed lines illustrate policy-change
split points. The first one marks government implementation of a temporary reserve policy for corn from Octo-
ber 20, 2008, which played an important role in supporting the market. The second one shows the government
for the first time lowering purchase prices on September 17, 2015, cutting them about 12%. This event was
regarded as a signal that the government would implement temporary reserve policy reform. The last one
signals that on March 28, 2016, the government abolished the policy of temporary reserves and proposed a
new policy of market-based acquisitions and subsidies. The sample period extends from January 1, 2005 to
December 22, 2018.
price during upturns or downturns. Several researchers provide empirical evidence of psychological
barriers in gold (Aggarwal and Lucey, 2007) and energy derivatives markets (Dowling et al., 2016;
Narayan et al., 2011). Futures prices are affected by a wide variety of behavioral biases, according to
behavioral finance (Hirshleifer, 2001). Formation of psychological barriers is likely to be caused by an
influx of sell or buy orders, reflecting heterogeneous expectations on specific events. Consistent with
the literature, our findings suggest the presence of psychological barriers in agricultural commodity
futures markets 12.
Wheat prices in 2014 ended lower after initially rising in the first half of the year. Under the
state policy of a minimum purchase price, a specific price level is set in advance. Once prices increase
too fast and remain sustainably above the minimum purchase price, this policy would stop. The aim
of the minimum purchase policy was to stabilize prices, not to raise prices. The minimum purchase
price was not exactly the actual purchase price in the market; the aim was to play a supporting
role when market prices fell excessively. The skew probability in 2014 was far lower than 0.5, which
12We conducted tests according to the concept of cluster behavior derived by (Avery and Zemsky, 1998; Westerhoff,
2003).
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reflected such phenomena. The government bought a large amount of wheat in 2016 to support the
market, and wheat became overstocked in 2017, which put pressure on price dynamics. The National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) cut the minimum purchase price for wheat for the
first time in 12 years in 2017. Such changes sent a signal that the government had begun to reform
and destock, which was negative market news. The skew probability in 2017 was far less than 0.5,
which reflected this phenomenon from another perspective. The minimum purchase price of wheat
was slightly reduced for 2018 and 2019. Imported wheat had obvious cost advantages, and wide price
differences between domestic and international wheat put pressure on the support policy. Such price
differences are observed in Figure 2. Imported wheat was favored in the domestic market, and the
import volume of wheat maintained a high level. This is why skew phenomena cannot be detected in
2018. A reasonable explanation for this is that the power of government intervention could not exceed
the power of markets.
The CD statistics in Table 4 show that the Markov chains converge, which demonstrates the
effectiveness of MCMC estimation. The generalized quasi-likelihood ratio test is significant at the
10% level, indicating that the skew OU model is superior to the OU model when skew phenomena are
significant in strong gluten wheat futures markets. In addition, we report the estimation results of
MLE for the OU model, with parameters κ, θ, and σ. Parameters κ in the OU model are not always
significant for the whole sample. Such results show that the skew OU model is superior to the OU
model when modeling the Chinese strong gluten wheat futures market with regulation.
4.2 Oilseed Futures Market
The estimation results for No. 1 soybean futures are tabulated in Table 5. The speed of mean reversion
shows great variation in No. 1 soybean markets. The mean-reversion coefficients of No. 1 soybean in
2011 and 2014 were greater than 8, indicating that, from the starting point to the long-term mean,
the process took less time. Other parameters are similar in magnitude. Skew probability is different
from 0.5 at the 10% significance level in almost half of samples for No. 1 soybean futures. The skew
probability was 0.1646 in 2004, indicating that prices were more likely to go down upon hitting the
skew level. This phenomenon was consistent with the 2004 soybean crisis. Skew levels may not only
reflect government intervention, but also the impact of specific events. In this case, skew levels acted
as psychological levels. We can explain this from the perspective of behavioral finance as mentioned
above in subsection 4.1. There existed potential strong supporting levels in 2007, 2009, and 2010,
when skew probability was greater than 0.5. As shown in Figure 9, prices were at a relatively low level
in the trend. The opinion in 2007 that increasing use of biofuels might lead to a decrease in soybean oil
supply caused soymeal prices to rise, which indirectly made soybean prices rise. Skew levels also acted
as psychological levels on this occasion. Soybean prices experienced roller-coaster-type fluctuations
from 2007 to 2008, as shown in Figure 3. To stabilize soybean prices, the government implemented a
temporary reserve policy for soybeans from 2008 to 2013, which formed strong support. Significant
skew phenomena in 2009 and 2010 were partly attributable to government intervention. Skew levels
may not only reflect tangible government intervention in the market, but also the effectiveness of policy
through the value of skew probabilities. The more that skew probability deviates from 0.5, the more
effective government policy is. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, the ratio of government
reserves to yields reached 20% for 2009 and 2010. Such strong government intervention policy is
demonstrated by the high skew probability in 2010.
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Table 4: Parameter estimation results of skew OU model in strong gluten wheat futures market
Year
Skew OU estimates OU estimates
κ̂ θ̂ σ̂ â p̂ p-value1 p-value2 κ̂0 θ̂0 σ̂0
2004
1.0851 7.5129 0.0986 7.4292 0.4501 0.0584 0.0982 -2.4787 7.6369 0.0975
(0.9546) (0.0812) (0.0054) (0.0093) (0.2592) (278.6990) (289.5675) (1.2420) (0.0645) (0.0046)
[0.5170] [0.9386] [-0.3093] [0.5715] [0.5115] [297.8248] [288.6072] [1047.5660]
2005
1.0631 7.4336 0.0739 7.4158 0.3021 0.0012 0.0013 0.9160 7.3669 0.0763
(0.5268) (0.0972) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.1128) (124.6721) (114.6502) (2.9261) (0.2559) (0.0036)
[1.0968] [0.7515] [0.3797] [0.8538] [-1.0259] [299.0466] [292.7448] [1113.2548]
2006
0.2333 7.4359 0.1119 7.4175 0.5640 0.2458 0.0540 -0.2472 7.3902 0.1173
(0.1248) (0.0876) (0.0063) (0.0291) (0.2648) (323.3226) (276.2116) (1.6025) (0.5619) (0.0054)
[1.3278] [0.4310] [0.9666] [0.3803] [0.4165] [398.5174] [295.3736] [1049.5686]
2007
1.1544 7.5529 0.1198 7.5127 0.5073 0.4856 0.4766 1.2499 7.5578 0.1201
(0.4254) (0.0247) (0.0061) (0.0459) (0.1703) (337.3384) (336.3998) (2.1850) (0.1008) (0.0056)
[0.2508] [-0.0918] [1.2161] [-0.0508] [0.9953] [397.2972] [395.8844] [1008.8110]
2008
1.4080 7.5910 0.1105 7.5907 0.6494 0.0040 0.0127 2.3571 7.5747 0.1211
(0.6161) (0.0437) (0.0059) (0.0073) (0.1122) (541.4938) (488.2592) (2.9310) (0.0767) (0.0056)
[0.7834] [-0.2040] [-0.7687] [0.9581] [-0.4843] [403.6905] [402.6362] [1041.8777]
2009
1.9695 7.6516 0.0516 7.6526 0.7458 <0.0001 0.0002 2.0998 7.6422 0.0522
(1.0422) (0.0087) (0.0034) (0.0096) (0.1602) (845.9692) (831.1834) (2.0982) (0.0368) (0.0024)
[0.7784] [0.9094] [-0.1568] [1.5949] [-0.5734] [402.5024] [401.0599] [1231.6995]
2010
0.5924 7.7849 0.0577 7.8914 0.7879 0.0418 0.0090 0.2857 8.1375 0.0599
(0.2454) (0.0837) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0874) (273.8971) (234.3664) (0.9467) (1.1861) (0.0028)
[-0.8237] [-0.5471] [-0.3294] [-1.4264] [-0.5413] [299.3740] [299.3778] [1163.7674]
2011
1.5845 7.8957 0.0896 7.8616 0.6002 0.1228 0.1192 0.7995 7.5559 0.0885
(0.7215) (0.1015) (0.0047) (0.0685) (0.2396) (394.2559) (398.9916) (1.3561) (0.5980) (0.0041)
[0.7616] [-0.1369] [0.1532] [0.1318] [1.4119] [402.7882] [407.2337] [1102.5217]
2012
2.3179 7.8010 0.0762 7.8185 0.6494 0.0015 0.0035 2.2238 7.7587 0.0803
(0.8143) (0.0462) (0.0041) (0.0152) (0.0580) (586.1892) (542.7265) (2.8589) (0.1000) (0.0037)
[0.8297] [1.4063] [0.1448] [1.1377] [0.1573] [398.5142] [398.9795] [1130.2200]
2013
0.2793 7.9023 0.0524 7.9143 0.5095 0.3986 0.2567 -0.5266 7.8370 0.0540
(0.2607) (0.0833) (0.0024) (0.0327) (0.2631) (327.4408) (315.2508) (1.0787) (0.1570) (0.0025)
[-0.0699] [0.1865] [0.6519] [1.0763] [-0.9307] [390.4920] [384.3877] [1203.2664]
2014
0.7238 7.8885 0.0503 7.9525 0.3982 0.0003 0.0024 -1.7341 7.9572 0.0539
(0.4988) (0.0959) (0.0022) (0.0294) (0.2221) (617.6093) (525.6152) (1.4204) (0.0581) (0.0025)
[-0.3625] [0.1387] [0.2587] [-0.0529] [-1.3065] [401.2676] [376.1997] [1244.9249]
2015
0.3924 7.9079 0.0554 7.8461 0.6287 <0.0001 0.0010 -0.8664 7.8872 0.0633
(0.3928) (0.0654) (0.0053) (0.0078) (0.1292) (867.8629) (647.8630) (1.7441) (0.0834) (0.0029)
[0.0706] [-0.0618] [0.4621] [0.3125] [-0.5636] [400.1120] [390.6825] [1196.2753]
2016
2.8947 7.9693 0.0778 7.9011 0.3651 0.3378 0.3559 2.6812 7.9772 0.0783
(0.3291) (0.0059) (0.0036) (0.0363) (0.1566) (352.8038) (349.1789) (1.7191) (0.0449) (0.0037)
[0.6241] [0.1155] [1.3970] [-0.8408] [0.9196] [402.2591] [400.9691] [1107.1515]
2017
0.1144 7.9221 0.0726 8.0209 0.2189 <0.0001 <0.0001 -0.3403 7.8857 0.0856
(0.1071) (0.0804) (0.0037) (0.0079) (0.0498) (1669.2981) (1296.5001) (1.1652) (0.2854) (0.0039)
[-0.6788] [-1.2006] [0.3131] [0.0897] [-1.3372] [396.3924] [387.2208] [1124.5755]
2018
5.3994 7.8409 0.0658 7.8382 0.5708 0.0988 0.1459 3.5233 7.8286 0.0684
(1.1064) (0.0051) (0.0029) (0.0008) (0.0242) (391.8279) (372.6791) (4.5804) (0.0418) (0.0033)
[-1.5714] [-0.5880] [1.2566] [0.0360] [-0.2934] [391.5100] [389.7579] [1079.0134]
Notes: Columns (2) to (6) report estimation results based on skew OU model via Bayesian methods. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. CD statistics are reported in square brackets. Column (7) reports p-value1
for whether the estimator of the skew probability is significantly different from 0.5. Column (8) reports p-
value2 of the generalized quasi-likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that the OU model is more suitable
than the skew OU model. Corresponding test statistics are reported in parentheses. To save space, the critical
values at the significance level of 10% used are reported in square brackets. Columns (9) to (11) report
estimation results based on the OU model via MLE methods. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Values of the maximized log-likelihood function are reported in square brackets. The estimation period is
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Figure 8: Skew phenomena in strong gluten wheat futures market
Notes: This figure shows logarithmic prices of strong gluten wheat futures (solid curve) with skew levels
where skew probabilities are significantly larger than 0.5 (horizontal red dashed lines) and skew levels where
skew probabilities are significantly smaller than 0.5 (horizontal green dashed lines). The vertical dashed lines
illustrate policy-change split points. The first one marks the government for the first time implementing the
floor purchase price policy for wheat on May 19, 2006. The second one shows that the NDRC cut the minimum
purchase price for wheat for the first time for 12 years on October 27, 2017, which was negative market news.
The sample period extends from January 1, 2004 to December 22, 2018.
Since implementation of the temporary reserve policy, prices of domestic soybean became much
higher than imported soybean. The ratio of government reserves to yields was less than 10% for 2012
and 2013. Therefore, the effectiveness of government intervention was weakened in this case. The
temporary reserve policy for soybean was stopped in 2014 and the government started trials of a target
price subsidy policy in the same year. Soybean prices began to be determined more by the market,
and government no longer directly intervened in market prices. When the average market price was
lower than the target price for a certain period, the state would subsidize price differences to farmers.
When the market price was high, government did not grant subsidies. This change could be regarded
as the start of policy reform. This could partly explain why there were no significant skew phenomena
for six years from 2010. The year 2017 showed a strong pressure level as prices were at relatively high
levels and skew probability was less than 0.5. The destocking of soybean caused the market to have
a higher probability of decline. In the same year, the government abandoned the target price subsidy
policy and changed to a direct producer subsidy policy.
The CD statistics in Table 5 suggest that convergence is attained for Markov chains. According
to the results of a generalized quasi-likelihood ratio test, the skew OU model performs significantly
better than the OU model at the 10% significance level in the No. 1 soybean market when skew
phenomena are significant. In addition, we report the estimation results of MLE for the OU model,
with parameters κ, θ and σ. Parameters κ in the OU model are not significant in most years. These
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results show that the skew OU model is superior to the OU model when modeling the Chinese No. 1
soybean futures market with government controls.
Table 5: Parameter estimation results of skew OU model in No. 1 soybean futures market
Year
Skew OU estimates OU estimates
κ̂ θ̂ σ̂ â p̂ p-value1 p-value2 κ̂0 θ̂0 σ̂0
2003
1.4783 7.9253 0.1381 7.8764 0.2840 0.0901 0.0597 0.8833 8.3510 0.1397
(0.7009) (0.0959) (0.0068) (0.0942) (0.3044) (296.8853) (287.8277) (1.4277) (0.7079) (0.0065)
[-1.1189] [0.5124] [0.3215] [1.5766] [1.5642] [299.9424] [300.5365] [974.0207]
2004
0.4146 8.0900 0.1553 8.0898 0.1646 <0.0001 0.0006 0.0384 7.0114 0.1729
(0.1845) (0.0704) (0.0077) (0.0217) (0.0731) (720.7043) (645.3221) (1.1786) (31.7260) (0.0079)
[0.9456] [-0.4225] [1.2279] [-0.1391] [0.4759] [398.4501] [396.7737] [965.3000]
2005
5.9215 7.9357 0.1356 8.0036 0.3963 0.3394 0.3672 5.2200 7.9359 0.1388
(1.0294) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0483) (0.1536) (356.0582) (348.6976) (2.1345) (0.0286) (0.0065)
[-0.0364] [0.7594] [0.0975] [0.8535] [0.1657] [411.5966] [406.8624] [971.3505]
2006
2.4382 7.8063 0.0960 7.8077 0.3965 0.0052 0.0055 2.3250 7.8062 0.1000
(0.3480) (0.0265) (0.0042) (0.0346) (0.2327) (211.2027) (186.5777) (2.1465) (0.0819) (0.0046)
[1.0509] [-1.1959] [-1.3833] [-1.5721] [0.4864] [300.5590] [294.9058] [1069.1474]
2007
1.2242 8.2268 0.1301 8.0021 0.6400 0.0093 0.0072 -1.7994 7.9293 0.1314
(1.0819) (0.0936) (0.0075) (0.0398) (0.1818) (488.7164) (476.2796) (0.9636) (0.1517) (0.0061)
[0.2069] [-0.9910] [-0.1770] [1.6296] [-1.3260] [397.5622] [372.9233] [992.4909]
2008
0.4146 8.0900 0.1553 8.0898 0.1646 0.3636 0.2934 1.8697 8.3746 0.2711
(0.1845) (0.0704) (0.0077) (0.0217) (0.0731) (336.5763) (330.1581) (1.7661) (0.1570) (0.0126)
[-0.0035] [-0.3025] [1.6372] [-0.7372] [-0.4900] [405.4896] [404.8908] [835.8767]
2009
6.6383 8.2408 0.1442 8.2362 0.5517 0.0612 0.0504 5.5974 8.2504 0.1474
(0.5376) (0.0030) (0.0063) (0.0294) (0.2138) (297.6236) (289.7856) (3.2485) (0.0413) (0.0069)
[-1.2765] [1.4416] [0.2167] [0.9925] [-0.5299] [310.3224] [307.5528] [965.9856]
2010
0.9382 8.3228 0.1079 8.3279 0.7035 0.0515 0.0622 0.9328 8.3532 0.1069
(0.4943) (0.0357) (0.0057) (0.0207) (0.1586) (277.6822) (282.2916) (2.0341) (0.1666) (0.0050)
[0.9530] [-0.8491] [0.8743] [0.7648] [1.1832] [297.5474] [297.1545] [1017.6968]
2011
9.0765 8.4089 0.0941 8.4217 0.4657 0.4598 0.4564 8.1027 8.4096 0.0945
(0.8647) (0.0025) (0.0046) (0.0275) (0.1310) (346.0882) (344.2663) (3.3016) (0.0123) (0.0044)
[1.0523] [-1.4095] [-0.0557] [-0.3322] [-0.1885] [419.2613] [414.1819] [1054.6846]
2012
3.7632 8.4525 0.0904 8.4035 0.5124 0.4773 0.4303 3.3857 8.4494 0.0918
(0.4970) (0.0053) (0.0043) (0.0552) (0.1662) (341.9156) (334.9296) (2.2863) (0.0298) (0.0044)
[0.1073] [-0.4901] [-0.0468] [-0.2103] [-0.6909] [408.7132] [401.6794] [1042.7410]
2013
2.2892 8.4547 0.0584 8.4401 0.3495 0.2744 0.3136 2.8193 8.4503 0.0609
(0.2964) (0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0186) (0.2443) (350.7903) (320.8941) (2.0206) (0.0235) (0.0029)
[-0.7471] [0.9313] [0.7741] [0.1529] [1.4726] [392.3907] [391.5739] [1139.5673]
2014
10.6777 8.4105 0.0897 8.3902 0.2292 0.3766 0.3927 10.9440 8.4145 0.0907
(0.7567) (0.0016) (0.0046) (0.0081) (0.1200) (360.8008) (357.5476) (3.5870) (0.0101) (0.0042)
[0.4745] [0.2966] [0.7097] [0.6425] [-0.2089] [430.0501] [427.9445] [1106.1802]
2015
1.8715 8.3242 0.1007 8.3333 0.5404 0.3747 0.4184 1.4627 8.1259 0.1000
(0.7517) (0.0916) (0.0058) (0.0237) (0.1192) (349.9926) (347.5607) (1.8057) (0.2587) (0.0047)
[-0.4669] [-0.8793] [0.3261] [-1.3564] [-0.5578] [407.3435] [415.2278] [1060.0387]
The speed of mean reversion shows great variation in soymeal markets. The mean-reversion speed
of soymeal in 2006 was greater than 10, indicating that, from the starting point to the long-term mean,
the process took less time. Other parameters are similar in magnitude. Soymeal is mainly squeezed
from imported transgenic soybeans and therefore more affected by international soybean prices. For
soymeal futures, skew phenomena were present only in several years. Prices of soymeal are affected
mainly by international soybean prices and are thus less influenced by government intervention. The
skew probability was 0.2183 for 2002, 0.3745 for 2011, 0.2563 for 2012 and 0.3193 for 2017, showing




Skew OU estimates OU estimates
κ̂ θ̂ σ̂ â p̂ p-value1 p-value2 κ̂0 θ̂0 σ̂0
2016
2.5367 8.2273 0.1421 8.1978 0.4149 0.2581 0.2953 2.7486 8.2317 0.1418
(0.7530) (0.0121) (0.0099) (0.0779) (0.2035) (328.1071) (328.5458) (2.6107) (0.0553) (0.0066)
[-0.4037] [-0.5122] [0.4513] [-0.1824] [-0.8095] [404.1758] [402.2353] [974.8278]
2017
1.2896 8.2344 0.0885 8.2801 0.3562 0.0428 0.0486 1.3661 8.1721 0.0882
(0.4578) (0.0980) (0.0039) (0.0616) (0.1653) (442.2895) (442.0724) (1.9563) (0.1400) (0.0042)
[-0.4969] [0.6677] [-0.6600] [-1.0359] [0.1252] [404.3415] [407.5605] [1065.7271]
2018
2.8586 8.1943 0.1034 8.2322 0.3592 0.1180 0.0576 0.6130 7.6569 0.1025
(0.9681) (0.1173) (0.0079) (0.0034) (0.0465) (409.3383) (411.8101) (2.4933) (2.2109) (0.0049)
[1.1204] [0.0309] [1.0144] [-1.3695] [-0.1840] [415.6813] [388.1889] [1018.0001]
Notes: Columns (2) to (6) report estimation results based on skew OU model via Bayesian methods. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. CD statistics are reported in square brackets. Column (7) reports p-value1
for whether the estimator of the skew probability is significantly different from 0.5. Column (8) reports p-
value2 of the generalized quasi-likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that the OU model is more suitable
than the skew OU model. Corresponding test statistics are reported in parentheses. To save space, the critical
values at the significance level of 10% used are reported in square brackets. Columns (9) to (11) report
estimation results based on the OU model via MLE methods. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Values of the maximized log-likelihood function are reported in square brackets. The estimation period is
based on daily observations from January 1, 2003 to December 22, 2018.
factors, like the European Debt Crisis, high excess stock, and the nuclear crisis in Japan put pressure
on prices. In 2012, high yield expectations in South America also put pressure on price dynamics.
In addition, since late May, to curb the rise in soybean prices, the government increased auctions of
reserve soybean. This policy played a macro-regulation role in the soymeal market. In 2017, negative
factors like high yields depressed prices. Given the above, stock-to-use ratio, natural disasters, and
other factors would also affect the price trend. Farmers and investors had different expectations about
the impact of the same given event. Skew levels could reflect the imbalance between bullishness and
bearishness. We show skew levels in Figure 10.
The CD statistics in Table 6 show that the Markov chains converge. According to the results of
a generalized quasi-likelihood ratio test, the skew OU model performs significantly better than the
OU model at the 10% significance level in the soymeal market when skew phenomena are significant.
Additionally, we report the estimation results of MLE for the OU model, with parameters κ, θ, and
σ. Parameters κ in the OU model are not significant in most cases. These results show that the skew
OU model is superior to the OU model when modeling the Chinese soymeal futures market.
4.3 Soft Futures Market
Table 7 shows parameter estimation results from applying the skew OU model to cotton futures. The
mean-reversion coefficient of cotton futures in 2017 was significantly greater than in other years. In
cotton futures markets, years 2007, 2009, 2017, and 2018 showed significant support levels. There
existed potential pressure levels in 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2014. Most skew probabilities in cotton
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Figure 9: Skew phenomena in No. 1 soybean futures market
Notes: This figure shows logarithmic prices of No. 1 soybean futures (solid curve) with skew levels where
skew probabilities are significantly greater than 0.5 (horizontal red dashed lines) and skew level where skew
probabilities are significantly smaller than 0.5 (horizontal green dashed lines). The vertical dashed lines
illustrate policy-change split points. The first one marks the government implementing the temporary reserve
policy for soybeans from October 20, 2008, which formed strong support. The second one shows that such
policy was stopped on January 19, 2014, and the government started trials of the target price subsidy policy
in the same year. The last one indicates that on March 23, 2017, the government abandoned the target price
subsidy policy and changed to a direct producer subsidy policy. The sample period extends from January 1,
2003 to December 22, 2018.
The financial crisis of 2008 caused prices of agricultural commodities such as soybean and cotton
to plummet. From August 21, 2008 to April 10, 2009, China purchased and stored 2.78 million tons
of cotton. For the next two years, the NDRC suspended the policy to launch a cotton temporary
state reserve program. However, cotton prices experienced a roller-coaster ride from 2010 to 2011, as
shown in Figure 5. To protect the interests of farmers, the NDRC launched a cotton temporary state
reserve program again in the spring of 2011 (March 2011). The policy established a purchase price of
19,800 RMB per ton, 35% above the world cotton price. On March 2, 2012, the NDRC announced a
new state reserve purchase price of 20,400 RMB per ton, 65% above the world price. This purchase
price was maintained by the NDRC for 2013. The policy strongly supported prices for nearly three
years and kept prices at a relatively high and stable level. As the domestic price was much higher
than the cost of imports, cotton textile enterprises purchased raw materials from abroad and pressure
on the government reserve increased sharply. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, the ratio of
government reserves to production exceeded 90% in 2013. It would be interesting to observe how skew
levels behaved as pressure levels in this case. From Figure 11, we observe that prices did not rise in
these years. Thus, the skew OU model may reflect the true trend of market. There was potential
downward pressure, although government policy maintained the price dynamics. Skew levels in Figure
23
Table 6: Parameter estimation results of skew OU model in soymeal futures market
Year
Skew OU estimates OU estimates
κ̂ θ̂ σ̂ â p̂ p-value1 p-value2 κ̂0 θ̂0 σ̂0
2001
5.5415 7.3814 0.1039 7.5427 0.3474 0.1056 0.0841 4.2944 7.3708 0.1083
(0.6433) (0.0024) (0.0054) (0.0830) (0.2850) (490.0460) (477.8651) (1.8353) (0.0407) (0.0051)
[-1.4085] [0.9794] [-0.1562] [-0.9915] [-0.6867] [492.9921] [467.8205] [1028.2475]
2002
0.5268 7.4772 0.0785 7.3907 0.4387 0.0259 0.0158 0.1185 8.0790 0.0801
(0.2795) (0.0980) (0.0037) (0.0165) (0.2183) (260.2259) (245.2872) (1.3948) (7.2437) (0.0038)
[0.3809] [-0.2886] [0.3424] [0.7948] [0.6897] [299.1455] [296.5196] [1082.7358]
2003
0.9903 7.7095 0.1406 7.6656 0.5369 0.2199 0.1765 0.7739 8.1120 0.1407
(0.5117) (0.1123) (0.0069) (0.0954) (0.1803) (320.1025) (314.1956) (1.1488) (0.6386) (0.0066)
[0.5410] [-0.4112] [0.8543] [1.3729] [-0.3868] [395.5619] [389.7675] [955.5229]
2004
0.4398 7.8383 0.1970 7.9159 0.5231 0.3909 0.3196 0.4746 7.5822 0.2035
(0.1980) (0.1103) (0.0097) (0.0314) (0.2265) (334.2769) (327.0848) (1.3600) (1.0228) (0.0094)
[-0.3294] [-0.5226] [-0.9604] [-1.2451] [-0.4153] [397.4772] [399.5967] [914.5757]
2005
3.5033 7.8122 0.1465 7.8677 0.5654 0.9295 0.0799 4.9007 7.8026 0.1529
(0.5658) (0.0223) (0.0076) (0.0369) (0.0965) (316.1142) (299.4918) (2.0424) (0.0330) (0.0072)
[-0.8713] [-0.5393] [-0.7629] [-1.2401] [-0.1614] [320.1430] [304.8178] [932.5880]
2006
14.4081 7.7281 0.1160 7.7640 0.4116 0.2234 0.1238 11.0722 7.7303 0.1210
(0.9233) (0.0009) (0.0061) (0.0122) (0.1014) (330.1335) (311.0072) (4.1997) (0.0124) (0.0056)
[0.0654] [-1.2583] [1.3697] [0.1153] [-0.0987] [439.8630] [427.6741] [1015.8713]
2007
1.2267 7.9739 0.1491 7.9338 0.4594 0.3938 0.1216 -2.2844 7.7923 0.1470
(0.9593) (0.0955) (0.0079) (0.0982) (0.1789) (344.8200) (350.8450) (1.3181) (0.1078) (0.0069)
[-0.0580] [-0.6190] [-0.6764] [1.2218] [-0.3134] [396.7047] [357.2309] [954.0166]
2008
0.8005 8.1123 0.2773 7.7801 0.4173 0.8874 0.0823 -1.1704 8.0856 0.2776
(0.4121) (0.0804) (0.0143) (0.0955) (0.2618) (280.7010) (281.2506) (1.6690) (0.2478) (0.0130)
[1.0489] [-0.1882] [1.3300] [-1.4421] [-0.5260] [402.6970] [288.2498] [819.6612]
2009
7.3129 8.0138 0.1785 7.9981 0.3696 0.0809 0.1074 6.8482 8.0096 0.1870
(0.4267) (0.0053) (0.0088) (0.0110) (0.0678) (439.8323) (419.5339) (3.6688) (0.0444) (0.0088)
[0.6061] [-1.5383] [-1.5118] [0.8595] [-1.0495] [429.2588] [422.8481] [903.1169]
2010
0.8688 8.0264 0.1145 8.0101 0.4793 0.4326 0.2449 0.3200 8.3771 0.1206
(0.4648) (0.0889) (0.0057) (0.0230) (0.1782) (339.9995) (321.5437) (1.7874) (2.1237) (0.0056)
[1.0312] [0.5101] [0.5580] [0.9525] [0.3405] [397.1365] [392.5100] [1012.1874]
2011
1.3773 8.0472 0.1085 8.0145 0.3745 0.0951 0.0919 1.4036 8.0445 0.1097
(0.2685) (0.0186) (0.0052) (0.0786) (0.2216) (294.2502) (291.3003) (1.6493) (0.0939) (0.0052)
[-0.1873] [1.4204] [-1.3404] [1.4820] [-0.2369] [295.9383] [293.9356] [1020.8100]
2012
1.4668 8.1890 0.1493 8.2182 0.2563 0.0014 0.0011 0.8310 8.4902 0.1497
(0.6320) (0.1030) (0.0067) (0.0745) (0.2211) (571.8305) (572.7913) (1.4553) (0.6396) (0.0070)
[-0.4014] [0.3521] [0.7714] [1.6483] [1.0766] [399.0703] [396.9783] [962.3314]
2013
3.7255 8.1575 0.1297 8.1289 0.4749 0.2387 0.0747 5.4107 8.1708 0.1448
(0.1848) (0.0096) (0.0063) (0.0055) (0.0488) (359.8151) (290.8086) (3.1519) (0.0438) (0.0068)
[1.6157] [-0.0947] [-1.6242] [-1.3945] [0.3717] [396.4205] [298.5343] [970.1129]
2014
0.5461 8.0432 0.1252 8.0989 0.5274 0.3872 0.4611 -1.0326 8.1658 0.1255
(0.5280) (0.0935) (0.0071) (0.1288) (0.2408) (336.9429) (337.3194) (1.4440) (0.1790) (0.0059)
[-0.1824] [-0.3796] [-0.6299] [0.0302] [-0.1929] [400.2315] [389.3944] [1003.0602]
2015
1.9795 7.8726 0.1179 7.8682 0.4526 0.2201 0.2497 1.8672 7.7479 0.1157
(1.0992) (0.0986) (0.0063) (0.0804) (0.1272) (321.6554) (325.0563) (2.1741) (0.1658) (0.0054)
[-0.9297] [-1.6202] [-0.2890] [1.3687] [1.1131] [404.4687] [414.2212] [1017.5159]
11 backed up these phenomena in a more intuitive way. Similar phenomena could also be detected
in corn markets. In addition, although China had imposed quotas on cotton imports, the volume
of imports was several million tons higher than in previous years. The effectiveness of government
intervention policy was impacted by international cotton prices. MacDonald et al. (2015) point out




Skew OU estimates OU estimates
κ̂ θ̂ σ̂ â p̂ p-value1 p-value2 κ̂0 θ̂0 σ̂0
2016
1.3785 8.0456 0.1583 7.8923 0.4522 0.1910 0.1434 1.4353 8.0997 0.1624
(0.1555) (0.0082) (0.0087) (0.0164) (0.2116) (323.8808) (315.6145) (1.5875) (0.2320) (0.0075)
[0.4078] [-0.7537] [-0.1201] [0.5628] [0.1928] [403.1212] [401.9389] [951.7712]
2017
5.7710 7.9411 0.0968 7.9258 0.3193 0.0528 0.0433 6.0167 7.9396 0.0989
(0.6188) (0.0026) (0.0052) (0.0284) (0.2077) (279.1170) (273.6606) (3.7029) (0.0171) (0.0046)
[-0.1078] [-1.3395] [-0.6955] [0.2607] [-0.6101] [302.3935] [299.7747] [1067.2507]
2018
4.3869 8.0172 0.1229 8.0239 0.2898 0.0311 0.1278 3.5042 8.0155 0.1387
(0.1763) (0.0038) (0.0062) (0.0017) (0.0153) (482.4528) (380.3779) (2.2649) (0.0425) (0.0065)
[-1.1655] [-0.2541] [-0.2416] [0.8055] [-0.2862] [418.5567] [390.2440] [958.7297]
Notes: Columns (2) to (6) report estimation results based on the skew OU model via Bayesian methods.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. CD statistics are reported in square brackets. Column (7)
reports p-value1 for whether the estimator of the skew probability is significantly different from 0.5. Column
(8) reports p-value2 of the generalized quasi-likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that the OU model
is more suitable than the skew OU model. Corresponding test statistics are reported in parentheses. To save
space, the critical values at the significance level of 10% used are reported in square brackets. Columns (9)
to (11) report estimation results based on the OU model via MLE methods. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Values of the maximized log-likelihood function are reported in square brackets. The estimation
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Figure 10: Skew phenomena in soymeal futures market
Notes: This figure shows logarithmic prices of soymeal futures (solid curve) with skew level, where skew
probability is significantly greater than 0.5 (horizontal red dashed line) and skew levels where skew probabilities
are significantly smaller than 0.5 (horizontal green dashed lines). The vertical dashed line illustrates the
policy-change split point. It indicates that, since May 8, 2012, to curb the rise in soybean prices that year,
the government increased auctions of reserve soybean. The sample period extends from January 1, 2001 to
December 22, 2018.
price support program proved costly and unsustainable.
25
To better influence the market in the formation of cotton prices, the government for the first time
proposed that the temporary reserve program for cotton not be implemented in 2014. The government
changed its policy toward target price subsidies in the same year. The stock-to-use ratio of cotton
reached 154%13 and the pressure from destocking caused prices to fall. The skew probability in 2014
was far less than 0.5, reflecting the change in government policy. We again attribute this significant
phenomenon to government regulation. The target price of cotton had been steadily declining yearly
to reflect the fair market value. It declined from 19,800 RMB per ton in 2014 to 19,100 RMB per
ton in 2015, and then to 18,600 RMB per ton in 201614. Price differences between domestic and
international cotton tended to narrow. On the basis of straightening out the price difference and
destocking, government policy worked again. Significant skew phenomena in the final two years
indicate this.
The CD statistics in Table 7 show that the Markov chains converge, which indicates the effective-
ness of MCMC estimation. A generalized quasi-likelihood ratio test is statistically significant at the
10% level, indicating that the skew OU model is superior to the OU model when skew phenomena
are significant in cotton futures markets. In addition, we report the estimation results of MLE for the
OU model, with parameters κ, θ and σ. Parameters κ in the OU model are not significant compared
to those in the skew OU model. These results show that the skew OU model is superior to the OU
model when modeling the Chinese cotton futures market with government regulation.
There are only four years with significant skew phenomena for white sugar futures. However, cor-
responding skew probabilities are all far from 0.5, meaning that skew levels are very strong. Imported
sugar has a great influence on trends in sugar prices in China. Even with restricted quotas, the impact
of sugar smuggling remains, in that it impacts the effectiveness of government intervention. Among the
major sugar production countries of the world, China and Australia are the only two not to implement
high tariff protections, which determines the strong correlation between domestic and international
sugar prices. In the sugar market, there is also a temporary reserve policy. However, according to the
Ministry of Agriculture, the white sugar reserve is relatively small. Therefore, the effectiveness of the
policy is limited. As stated above, white sugar prices are more affected by growth habit. The years
2008, 2010, and 2017 showed strong price pressure levels, while 2016 showed a supporting level. Skew
levels in softs markets are shown in Figure 12 in a more intuitive way. Because of the financial crisis
of 2008 and the increase in yields, prices of white sugar futures had a large probability of going down.
In 2010, the Chinese government implemented large-scale destocking, putting prices under pressure.
Sugar yields fell more than expected in late 2015 and yields and the consumption gap significantly
increased, which formed strong support for prices in the following year. White sugar started a new
production cycle in 2017 and the high probability of falling prices is not surprising.
The CD statistics in Table 8 show that the Markov chains converge. A generalized quasi-likelihood
ratio test is statistically significant at the 10% level, indicating that the skew OU model is superior
to the OU model when skew phenomena are significant in white sugar futures markets. In addition,
we report the estimation results of MLE for the OU model, with parameters κ, θ, and σ. Parameters
κ in the OU model are not always significant. These results show that the skew OU model is superior
to the OU model when modeling the Chinese white sugar futures market with regulation.
13Data are from USDA.
14Data are from NDRC.
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Table 7: Parameter estimation results of skew OU model in cotton futures market
Year
Skew OU estimates OU estimates
κ̂ θ̂ σ̂ â p̂ p-value1 p-value2 κ̂0 θ̂0 σ̂0
2005
6.9464 9.5999 0.1081 9.5431 0.5641 0.2059 0.2681 6.6620 9.6015 0.1072
(0.3856) (0.0037) (0.0053) (0.0608) (0.2288) (328.4078) (330.8658) (2.1934) (0.0212) (0.0050)
[0.6229] [1.3088] [-0.8536] [1.3923] [0.6696] [438.6166] [434.2255] [1025.9676]
2006
2.8138 9.5187 0.0704 9.5277 0.6261 0.0564 0.1120 2.3062 9.5010 0.0716
(0.2011) (0.0053) (0.0030) (0.0262) (0.2129) (455.1432) (448.0201) (1.9427) (0.0648) (0.0034)
[1.1916] [1.0604] [-1.5705] [-1.4057] [1.4452] [425.0935] [454.4167] [1127.6786]
2007
0.6397 9.5613 0.0866 9.5201 0.5641 0.0970 0.0904 0.3213 9.3683 0.0870
(0.3246) (0.0952) (0.0044) (0.0424) (0.2674) (399.7786) (399.5887) (2.0317) (1.2923) (0.0041)
[-0.9473] [-0.5938] [-0.1979] [0.3632] [1.4460] [398.6641] [394.9261] [1087.7585]
2008
1.9335 9.411 0.1315 9.5836 0.6299 0.4000 0.3243 2.4939 9.4370 0.1326
(0.4219) (0.0549) (0.0071) (0.0485) (0.2359) (339.5171) (334.9599) (1.3913) (0.0740) (0.0062)
[-1.3117] [-0.6775] [-1.4036] [0.6969] [-0.2595] [416.2246] [420.0034] [986.1052]
2009
1.0990 9.5066 0.0915 9.5720 0.6345 0.0422 0.0194 -0.1104 6.8753 0.0952
(0.4437) (0.0974) (0.0049) (0.0208) (0.2159) (281.0151) (253.9608) (1.0948) (26.0644) (0.0044)
[1.5914] [-1.0994] [0.6909] [1.4193] [-1.1851] [305.0640] [292.7774] [1076.0997]
2010
1.2956 9.8933 0.1660 9.6848 0.2928 0.0030 0.0719 -2.2703 9.6982 0.1600
(0.6877) (0.1117) (0.0086) (0.0017) (0.1755) (184.1826) (196.7848) (0.8651) (0.0911) (0.0076)
[-0.1933] [0.5196] [0.9245] [0.0375] [1.1279] [301.2039] [212.6748] [914.2493]
2011
1.1663 10.0652 0.1620 10.3318 0.3934 0.4203 0.0900 1.1456 9.9068 0.1623
(0.5236) (0.1075) (0.0084) (0.0947) (0.1191) (346.4332) (343.1656) (1.0319) (0.2186) (0.0076)
[0.1904] [-0.0906] [0.0887] [1.0980] [-0.4278] [404.0264] [406.2046] [935.5665]
2012
1.8598 9.9104 0.0678 9.8925 0.2851 0.0176 0.0234 1.9140 9.9168 0.0703
(0.3388) (0.0071) (0.0031) (0.0183) (0.2429) (473.0420) (455.1697) (1.4319) (0.0398) (0.0033)
[-0.3320] [0.4582] [-0.5133] [0.6842] [-0.4752] [403.9204] [396.3608] [1131.8927]
2013
0.9902 9.8864 0.0513 9.8873 0.1452 0.0025 0.0054 1.0910 9.9723 0.0537
(0.5175) (0.0886) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0975) (535.0535) (495.2249) (1.9219) (0.1621) (0.0025)
[-0.1024] [-0.8716] [-0.4492] [0.9379] [0.7260] [391.0152] [388.3434] [1183.5427]
2014
0.5774 9.6354 0.1047 9.8181 0.0927 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.1352 7.9505 0.1233
(0.3010) (0.1004) (0.0043) (0.0177) (0.1352) (1485.8246) (1290.1908) (0.8897) (11.1417) (0.0056)
[-1.0196] [-0.4096] [-0.1793] [-0.4973] [0.0845] [404.1699] [398.5907] [1050.8106]
2015
1.0333 9.4408 0.0711 9.4134 0.4662 0.2426 0.3441 0.6575 9.2309 0.0698
(0.4307) (0.1008) (0.0036) (0.0682) (0.2240) (323.5382) (328.6415) (1.4822) (0.4894) (0.0033)
[-1.0326] [1.2578] [-0.3694] [-0.5112] [-1.0206] [400.1065] [401.3991] [1128.8779]
2016
0.9407 9.5455 0.1872 9.4994 0.5297 0.4915 0.4294 0.7179 9.7957 0.1856
(0.4617) (0.1083) (0.0091) (0.1626) (0.1826) (340.4079) (341.3451) (1.2521) (0.5992) (0.0087)
[-0.5260] [-0.3706] [1.0382] [-0.8583] [-1.4400] [399.9440] [393.7541] [904.7977]
2017
8.6837 9.6267 0.0965 9.6220 0.6085 0.0954 0.0939 7.7326 9.6240 0.0956
(0.8373) (0.0025) (0.005) (0.0300) (0.1664) (414.3270) (418.0817) (4.5380) (0.0158) (0.0045)
[0.6699] [0.2233] [-1.6406] [-1.1599] [0.6627] [411.9131] [414.2736] [1065.8698]
2018
1.4499 9.6749 0.0995 9.6114 0.7364 0.0004 0.0007 2.2311 9.6209 0.0979
(0.8489) (0.1065) (0.0052) (0.0086) (0.1562) (597.7851) (608.7934) (1.8562) (0.0637) (0.0047)
[-1.3837] [-0.2744] [-0.0959] [-0.2690] [0.4131] [385.5117] [383.7912] [991.5493]
Notes: Columns (2) to (6) report estimation results based on the skew OU model via Bayesian methods.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. CD statistics are reported in square brackets. Column (7)
reports p-value1 for whether the estimator of the skew probability is significantly different from 0.5. Column
(8) reports p-value2 of the generalized quasi-likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that the OU model
is more suitable than the skew OU model. Corresponding test statistics are reported in parentheses. To save
space, the critical values at the significance level of 10% used are reported in square brackets. Columns (9)
to (11) report estimation results based on the OU model via MLE methods. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Values of the maximized log-likelihood function are reported in square brackets. The estimation
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Figure 11: Skew phenomena in cotton futures market
Notes: This figure shows logarithmic prices of cotton futures (solid curve) with skew levels where skew proba-
bilities are significantly larger than 0.5 (horizontal red dashed lines) and skew levels where skew probabilities
are significantly smaller than 0.5 (horizontal green dashed lines). The vertical dashed lines illustrate policy-
change split points. The first one indicates that from August 21, 2008 to April 10, 2009, China purchased
and stored 2.78 million tons of cotton. For the next two years, the NDRC suspended this policy to launch a
cotton temporary state reserve program. The second one shows that the NDRC launched a cotton temporary
state reserve program again on March 28, 2011. The last one indicates that the government for the first time
proposed that the temporary reserve program for cotton would no longer be implemented beginning April 5,
2014 and changed the policy toward target price subsidies in the same year. The sample period extends from
January 1, 2005 to December 22, 2018.
5 Conclusion
This study indicates that government intervention causes agricultural commodities markets show
regulated and controlled characteristics. Traditional models have no way to characterize such features,
while the skew OU model is good at depicting them. Our empirical results demonstrate that skew
phenomena are quite significant and consistent with government intervention policy and other events
that may influence price dynamics. For grains futures, the observed skew phenomena are most notable.
For example, about 55% of samples show skew phenomena. Grains are important to the national
economy and people’s livelihoods and therefore government intervention in this market is relatively
high. We find that skew phenomena are relatively fewer for oilseed and soft futures, at only about 35%
and 43%, respectively. Prices of soybean and especially soymeal are affected more by international
prices. Therefore, government intervention in these markets is less.
Development of asset pricing models for agricultural commodities is of importance to both a-
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Table 8: Parameter estimation results of skew OU model in white sugar futures market
Year
Skew OU estimates OU estimates
κ̂ θ̂ σ̂ â p̂ p-value1 p-value2 κ̂0 θ̂0 σ̂0
2007
5.9709 8.2133 0.1151 8.2932 0.4243 0.1858 0.2066 6.1978 8.2132 0.1172
(0.4895) (0.0015) (0.0063) (0.0285) (0.1120) (378.0699) (372.8568) (2.6692) (0.0222) (0.0055)
[-0.3573] [-0.0077] [-1.2907] [-1.0277] [-1.1836] [406.4146] [404.7770] [1005.6696]
2008
2.8253 8.0446 0.1835 8.0540 0.3962 0.0345 0.0260 2.8898 8.0269 0.1877
(0.3273) (0.0218) (0.0083) (0.0498) (0.1883) (271.4965) (264.2120) (1.6527) (0.1117) (0.0087)
[-0.2405] [0.7285] [0.1109] [-0.6882] [0.8514] [307.0731] [307.5168] [921.8421]
2009
1.5987 8.5349 0.1554 8.3279 0.5017 0.3262 0.3256 1.2272 8.6408 0.1584
(0.1139) (0.0169) (0.0081) (0.1629) (0.2584) (337.6892) (329.2522) (1.0989) (0.2998) (0.0073)
[-0.2483] [-1.1427] [-0.1239] [1.3474] [-0.2443] [412.3988] [398.6075] [965.6894]
2010
1.4982 8.6347 0.1688 8.8195 0.3909 0.0371 <0.0001 -2.6771 8.4183 0.1664
(0.9743) (0.0971) (0.0088) (0.0235) (0.2080) (441.5502) (451.3755) (1.4710) (0.1250) (0.0078)
[0.6925] [-1.1271] [0.0560] [-1.2638] [-0.6591] [398.2507] [99.5074] [925.7219]
2011
2.0023 8.7865 0.1350 8.8235 0.3513 0.3182 0.3503 1.3671 8.7222 0.1381
(0.3443) (0.0256) (0.0061) (0.0170) (0.0624) (355.0410) (349.0426) (2.7111) (0.2502) (0.0064)
[-0.8280] [0.6855] [0.1551] [-0.3181] [-0.3380] [406.1263] [402.0220] [980.9162]
2012
1.5750 8.7172 0.0993 8.5984 0.5165 0.4750 0.4869 1.5078 8.7140 0.1002
(0.2593) (0.0156) (0.0043) (0.0444) (0.2023) (339.8405) (336.0781) (1.1216) (0.0744) (0.0047)
[1.2372] [0.4510] [-1.2258] [0.7128] [-0.6893] [402.1081] [396.8256] [1055.1750]
2013
3.3014 8.5043 0.0783 8.5448 0.3882 0.3841 0.3991 2.3296 8.4845 0.0803
(0.1443) (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0175) (0.0284) (351.8044) (343.4727) (2.1329) (0.0694) (0.0038)
[1.1701] [1.2367] [0.3101] [0.7077] [0.0251] [423.6766] [410.7322] [1072.6891]
2014
5.1766 8.3923 0.1162 8.4573 0.6227 0.1841 0.2638 6.7029 8.4029 0.1205
(0.6168) (0.0040) (0.0072) (0.0050) (0.0430) (390.8549) (373.2710) (3.6205) (0.0322) (0.0056)
[-0.1374] [-0.1843] [0.1618] [0.1582] [-1.1062] [421.1934] [421.5632] [1008.0949]
2015
9.6348 8.6077 0.1182 8.5565 0.6420 0.1607 0.1467 8.8492 8.6068 0.1186
(0.7947) (0.0019) (0.0051) (0.0522) (0.1740) (429.8219) (429.1688) (2.5474) (0.0152) (0.0055)
[0.3668] [-0.2525] [-0.8248] [0.2586] [0.1668] [453.0631] [447.4953] [1020.5067]
2016
0.7743 8.6948 0.0926 8.6891 0.7402 0.0108 0.0231 1.1527 8.7662 0.0985
(0.2246) (0.0187) (0.0040) (0.0063) (0.0845) (484.8185) (456.5882) (1.1346) (0.1099) (0.0046)
[0.1124] [0.4221] [0.5283] [1.0412] [0.8758] [400.8676] [396.9387] [1072.8612]
2017
0.8412 8.7530 0.0761 8.7515 0.2512 0.0277 0.0939 1.1155 8.7074 0.0836
(0.2601) (0.0198) (0.0044) (0.0064) (0.0481) (455.6202) (406.1461) (2.0714) (0.1520) (0.0039)
[-0.1809] [-0.6550] [-0.1576] [-0.0784] [0.1821] [402.3210] [402.9962] [1125.3138]
2018
1.4048 8.5663 0.0815 8.4992 0.5021 0.4999 0.2912 1.4671 8.4371 0.0828
(0.6939) (0.0975) (0.0050) (0.0065) (0.1435) (326.0771) (315.2275) (1.4010) (0.1448) (0.0039)
[0.3219] [0.0090] [1.3146] [-0.0361] [-0.1982] [390.7068] [401.1836] [1061.1547]
Notes: Columns (2) to (6) report estimation results based on the skew OU model via Bayesian methods.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. CD statistics are reported in square brackets. Column (7)
reports p-value1 for whether the estimator of the skew probability is significantly different from 0.5. Column
(8) reports p-value2 of the generalized quasi-likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that the OU model
is more suitable than skew OU model. Corresponding test statistics are reported in the parenthesis. To save
space, the critical values at the significance level of 10% used are reported in the square brackets. Columns
(9) to (11) report estimation results based on OU model via MLE methods. The standard errors are reported
in the parenthesis. Values of the maximized log-likelihood function are reported in the square brackets. The
estimation period is based on daily observations from January 1, 2007 to December 22, 2018.
cademics and practitioners. Compared to the traditional OU model, the skew OU model captures
specific regulatory characteristics, which is important for risk management in agricultural commodities
markets. In addition, the model shows the effectiveness of government regulatory policy, as reflected
by the magnitude of skew probabilities. Commodity futures have attracted more interest as a popular
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Figure 12: Skew phenomena in white sugar futures market
Note: This figure shows logarithmic prices of white sugar futures (solid curve) with the skew level, where skew
probability is significantly larger than 0.5 (horizontal red dashed line) and skew levels where skew probabilities
are significantly smaller than 0.5 (horizontal green dashed lines). The vertical dashed lines illustrate policy-
and yield-change split points. The first one indicates that from January 21, 2010, the government implemented
large-scale destocking, putting prices under pressure. The second one shows that sugar yields fell more than
expected in late 2015 and the yield and consumption gap significantly increased, forming strong support for
sugar prices in the following year. The last one indicates that white sugar began a new production cycle in
2017 and the high probability of falling prices is not surprising. The sample period extends from January 1,
2007 to December 22, 2018.
government policies on the basis of skew level and skew probability.
We estimate skew level and skew probability using data from futures prices. It would be interesting
to estimate these two parameters by combining information from both futures and corresponding
options prices. This represents a promising path for future research. Implied information in futures
options is often used as a forward-looking measure. Corn options, soymeal options, cotton options,
and sugar options are traded in China. Thus, in the future, even more data will be available for
research. Another interesting and important application of the skew OU model is to price agricultural
commodity derivatives. We focus mainly on skew phenomena in the agricultural futures markets and
hope to develop a more comprehensive model regarding the characteristics of regulation, seasonality,
and stochastic volatility.
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Appendices
A Definition of the Symmetric Local Time
Here we recall the definition of the symmetric local time from Protter (2004). Let sign (x) be the sign
function defined by:
sign (x) =
 1, if 0 < x,−1, if x ≤ 0.
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Then the right local time of X at the level a is:
LXt (a) , |Xt − a| − |X0 − a| −
∫ t
0
sign (Xs − a) dXs,
with the left local time LXt (a−) , limb↑a LXt (b) .
Hence, the symmetric local time L̂Xt (a) is given by:
L̂Xt (a) , [L
X
t (a) + L
X
t (a−)]/2.
B Transformation of the Skew OU Process
Since the function G(·) is the difference of two convex functions, we apply the generalized Itô formula
(see Revuz and Yor, 1999) to process Yt, and obtain:






















(x−) ) is the right (left) derivative of G (x), µ is the signed measure (when restricted
to compacts), which is the second derivative of G in the generalized function sense with the properties
µ ((a, b]) = G
′
(b+)−G′ (a−) and µ ({x}) = G′ (x+)−G′ (x−). Further, if G(·) is the bounded Borel
measurable function, we have the occupation time formula:
∫
R





(Xs) d 〈X〉s ,
then we have:





















































































We finally get the new process Yt without the local time component.
Remark B.1 The last equality holds because we use the fact that the skew diffusion admits the fol-
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We rewrite the right-hand side of Eq.(B.1) in terms of Yt, then the skew OU process Xt defined
in Eq.(2.3) is transformed to a tractable piecewise process Yt satisfying the following SDE:
dYt =
 κ [(1− p) θ + pa− Yt] dt+ (1− p)σdWt, if a ≤ Yt,κ [pθ + (1− p) a− Yt] dt+ pσdWt, if Yt < a.
C Bayesian Estimation of the Skew OU Process
C.1 Conditional Distribution of Instantaneous Return
Conditional on θ, σ, p and a, the conditional posterior distribution of mean-reversion speed κ should
be as follows:












i∈N1 yti {[−xti + ((1− p) θ + pa)]4t}




i∈N2 yti {[−xti + (pθ + (1− p) a)]4t}









i∈N1 {[xti − ((1− p) θ + pa)]4t}
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i∈N2 {[xti − (pθ + (1− p) a)]4t}
2





Similarly, given κ, σ, p and a, the conditional posterior distribution of long-term mean θ is:












i∈N1 [κ (1− p)4t (yti + κ4txti − κpa4t)]




i∈N2{κp4t [yti + κ4txti − κ (1− p) a4t]}














C.2 Conditional Distribution of Volatility
Conditional on κ, θ, p and a, the posterior distribution of σ2 is:

























{yti + κ4txti − κ [pθ + (1− p) a]4t}
2
+ λσ.
C.3 Conditional Distribution of Skew Level
Because it is hard to find the conjugate prior for the skew level a, the Griddy-Gibbs sampler is chosen
here in accordance with Ritter and Tanner (1992). The conditional posterior distribution of a is a
distribution with probability function:
p
(
ai|X,κ, θ, σ2, p
)
=
L (X|κ, θ, σ, ai, p)
Σnj=1L (X|κ, θ, σ, aj , p)
C.4 Conditional Distribution of the Skew Probability
Analogously, conditional on κ, θ, σ and a, we calculate the density of skew probability p as follows:
p
(
pi|X,κ, θ, σ2, a
)
=
L (X|κ, θ, σ, a, pi)
Σnj=1L (X|κ, θ, σ, a, pj)
D Convergence Diagnostic Test
We care that if the Markov chain of parameters generated from the Gibbs sampler converges to the
real posterior density function f(Θ|X).
As Geweke (1991) and Nakatsuma (2000) worked out, after discarding the first d runs for a
sequence, we can test the convergence through comparing the first m1 values in the remainder with



















where ŜiG (·) is the spectrum density estimate for mi runs. Let (m1 +m2) /m < 1 and fix the ratios
m1/m andm2/m. If the sequence {G (i) , i = d+ 1, · · · , d+m} is stationary, then applying the central
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limit theorem, we have
CD → N (0, 1) when m→∞.
We set the ratios m1/m and m2/m to be 0.1 and 0.5, as in Geweke (1991).
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